政治之外 烏克蘭經濟債台高築
摘錄自：天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 2014/3/14
2014-03-06Web only
作者：經濟學人
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| 圖片來源：flickr.com/photos/112078056@N07/ |
烏克蘭不是只有政治問題。1月中之前，烏克蘭幣兌美元匯率固定為8：1，現在約為10：1。政府最近發行了利率最高達15％的短期債務，其債券表現就和委內瑞拉一樣差；許多分析師擔心，烏克蘭可能很快就會無力支付其債務。
經濟混亂反映了近期的政治不穩定，但烏克蘭的經濟問題並非一日之寒；經濟政策不佳、不願改革與貪汙，合力拉垮了烏克蘭。後蘇聯時代初期，烏克蘭經濟的生產力極差，也和多數前蘇聯國家一樣，遭逢產出大減和通膨劇增，但烏克蘭受創格外嚴重。
烏克蘭經濟於2000年初期穩住腳步，資本回流也讓貨幣供給快速成長，自2001至2010年，廣義貨幣年增率達35％。2006與2007年信貸平均成長幅度為73%，資產開始顯得極度泡沫化，高通膨亦傷害了烏克蘭的出口競爭力。
全球危機過後、歐元危機加劇之際，烏克蘭遇上了資金乾枯，為烏克蘭幣帶來強大的下壓力。捍衛貨幣大大消耗央行儲備，自2011年高點400億美元降至約120億美元；上個月，央行承認敗戰，不再控制匯率。貨幣貶值雖有必要，短期內勢必會讓烏克蘭十分頭痛；約半數公債為外幣計價，貨幣貶值會讓烏克蘭的債務負擔更加沉重。
過去，烏克蘭一直不願推動改革。2010年，IMF同意向烏克蘭提供150 億美元有條件貸款。改革的重大目標之一，即為重度能源補助；國營天然氣公司Naftogaz向消費者收取的價格，僅達進口天然氣成本的四分之一。最終，烏克蘭無法處理能源補助，IMF於2011年凍結此協議。
其他領域的改革也不夠實在。烏克蘭雖然達成了2011年的減赤目標，靠的卻是減少資本支出，在此同時，薪資和退休金則過度支出；那實在不是達成永續經濟成長之道。貪汙和治理不善亦是重大問題；根據IMF研究，烏克蘭地下經濟約為GDP的50％。地下企業通常不繳稅，進一步減少了政府的資金。
目前，烏克蘭並不是非常擔心經濟問題。不過，烏克蘭今年得找出約250億美元，以處理巨額經常帳赤字和外債；外匯存底僅餘120億美元，無力償債當然有可能發生。等到危機真的結束，烏克蘭一定得處理經濟倒退這個問題才行。（黃維德譯）
©The Economist
Newspaper Limited 2014
The Economist
Ukraine and Russia
Why is
Ukraine's economy in such a mess?
By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: March
06, 2014
Mar 5th 2014,
11:22 by C.W. | LONDON
UKRAINE'S problems
are not just political. In recent weeks its economy has taken a hammering.
Until mid-January its currency, the hryvnia, was fixed at 8:1 with the dollar;
it now trades at about 10:1. The government has recently issued short-term debt
at interest rates as high as 15%; this year its bonds have done about as badly
as Venezuela's. Many analysts are worried that the country will soon default on
its debt.
The economic
turmoil reflects recent political instability. But Ukraine's economic problems
were long in the making. Dodgy economic policy, distaste for reform and endemic
corruption have brought the country to its knees.
In the immediate
post-Soviet era Ukraine was a massively unproductive economy. Like most former
Soviet republics it suffered huge output declines and soaring inflation. but
Ukraine was among the hardest hit of the lot. Hyperinflation in the early 1990s
resulted from lack of access to financial markets and massive monetary
expansion to finance government spending, in the face of sharply declining
output. The Ukrainian population was scarred by the experience of
hyperinflation. In response, in 1996 the Ukrainian central bank replaced the
old currency, the karbovanets, with the hryvnia and pledged to keep it stable
in relation to the dollar. The currency continued to wobble through the late
1990s, however, and particular amid the Russian rouble crisis of 1998.
Both Russia and
Ukraine stabilised by the early 2000s. Capital flowed back, attracted in part
by relatively high interest rates (the early 2000s, when the Fed pushed its
main interest rate down to 1% for an extended period were a rehearsal of sorts
for the post-crisis environment). As foreign cash flooded in the money supply
grew rapidly: from 2001 to 2010 broad money increased at an annual rate of 35%.
In 2006 and 2007 credit growth averaged 73%. Assets began to look
extraordinarily bubbly and high inflation damaged Ukraine's export
competitiveness.
After the global
crisis, and as the euro crisis intensified, Ukraine suffered from a drought in
capital flows (along with much of central and eastern Europe) which placed
strong downward pressure on the hryvnia. Protecting the currency drained the
central bank's reserves, which tumbled from a high of $40 billion in 2011 to about
$12 billion today. Last month the central bank admitted defeat and let the
currency go. Currency depreciation, while necessary, will be an economic
headache for Ukraine in the short term. About half of its public debt is in
foreign currencies: as the hrvynia loses value, Ukraine's debt burden rises.
Debt financing has also become more difficult as a result of the Federal
Reserve's "taper", which has wrong-footed many emerging markets by
stanching the previously steady flow of capital in their direction.
Ukraine has proven
reluctant to engage in reform. For a while it felt as if it didn't need to:
high commodity prices during the 2000s supported growth. Many of Ukraine's
exports went to Russia, a country that was also doing well on the back of high
oil prices. But Ukraine was badly hit by the financial crisis and plummeting
steel prices. GDP fell by 15% in 2009. That made it a prime candidate for
economic streamlining. In 2010 the IMF agreed to loan Ukraine $15 billion—with
conditions attached. A major target for reform were Ukraine's cushy energy
subsidies. The state gas company, Naftogaz, only charges consumers a quarter of
the cost of importing the gas. Cheap gas discourages investment: Ukraine is one
of the most energy-intensive economies in the world and domestic production has
slumped by two-thirds since the 1970s. The IMF ended up freezing the deal in
2011 after Kiev failed to touch the costly subsidies.
In other areas
reform has been half-hearted. The government did meet its public deficit target
of 2.8% of GDP in 2011. Yet this was achieved by skimping on capital
expenditures while overspending on wages and pensions: hardly the recipe for
sustainable economic growth. Progressively lowering the rate of corporation tax
has also weakened the state's finances.
Corruption and
poor governance are other major problems. The Ukrainian shadow economy is one
of the biggest in the world—at around 50% of GDP, according to IMF research.
Businesses operating underground tend not to pay taxes, further depriving the
government of funds. And last week Ukraine's new prime minister estimated that
$37 billion had gone missing during Viktor Yanukovych's rule.
Right now Ukraine
is not too worried about improving economic management. But big bills are
imminent: Ukraine needs to find about $25 billion this year to finance its
large current-account deficit and to meet foreign creditors. Foreign-exchange
reserves are only $12 billion. Default is certainly on the cards. When the
crisis does end, addressing its economic backwardness must be a major
objective.
©The Economist
Newspaper Limited 2014
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