含金湯匙出生 不會讓人更努力
摘錄自：天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 2014/3/28
2014-03-20 Web
only 作者：經濟學人
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| 圖片來源：flickr.com/photos/wwarby/ |
貴族政治已成過去式，現在是精英政治時代。但真的是如此嗎？皮克提（Thomas Piketty）在《21世紀資本》提出了十分有趣的洞見。他認為，當資本報酬率長期且大幅高於經濟成長率，遺產繼承必定優於存款；源於過往的財富，成長速度也會快過源自工作的財富。
皮克提以經濟流衡量遺產的重要性；簡言之，關鍵指標即為資本／收入比（財富佔GDP的比例）、死亡率（某年的人口死亡比例）、死者平均財富與活者平均財富之比。因此，如果資本／收入比為600％，死亡率為2％， 死者財富為活者的2倍，年度遺產流即為600%*2％*2，亦即全國收入的24％。
遺產的重要性在20世紀中葉大幅下滑，前述三項指標也都與之相關。歐洲的資本／收入比大幅下滑，死亡率下降，死者財富亦曾短暫地低於活者。最後一項或許讓人有些驚訝，但法國（皮克提的家鄉）的數據確實如此。
但從1950年代開始，資本／收入比與死者／活者財富比都開始上升。遺產在法國國家收入的佔比回升至11%；依照皮克提的核心假設，經濟年成長1.7％，資本報酬3％，遺產流將於本世紀中升至16-17％並趨於穩定。重點在於，只要財富集中、資本報酬夠高，財富就能無限期存續。
法國是個例外嗎？皮克提將焦點放在法國，是因為法國政府在革命之後便開始收集詳盡的財富資料。德國的遺產流模式與法國相似，英國經歷同樣的遺產流大減，但沒有出現同樣的回升。美國的資料不夠好，但相關證據顯示，美國的變動比法國平順。
如果你認為，最有才華的人爬上高層，才能讓經濟運作處於最佳狀況，那麼遺產就像是在作牌。要是你的父母擁有不動產或是英年早逝，你就比其他同樣努力工作、同樣有才華的人更具優勢。從歷史和小說來看，含著金湯匙出生通常不會讓人更努力，生活彷彿只是致力於炫燿和懶惰。（黃維德譯）
©The Economist
Newspaper Limited 2014
The Economist
Inequality
Inherited
wealth
By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: March 20, 2014
Mar 18th 2014,
17:10 by Buttonwood
WHILE Downton
Abbey may be a popular TV series, not many people see it as a model for how
society should function. The age of aristocracy, along with inherited wealth
and privilege, are behind us; we are all meritocrats now.
But is that really
true? Once again, Thomas Piketty, in his book "Capital in the 21st
Century", has come up with some interesting insights (for more posts on
the book, see hereand here). His primary thought is that
Whenever the rate
of return on capital is significantly and durably higher than the growth rate
of the economy, it is all but inevitable that inheritance (of fortunes
accumulated in the past) predominates over saving (wealth accumulated in the
present).... Wealth originating in the past automatically grows more rapidly,
even without labour, than wealth stemming from work, which can be saved.
How does one
measure the importance of inheritance? One approach is to rely on tax data but
this is often incomplete and makes international comparisons difficult (because
of the different tax treatment of asset classes). So the alternative approach,
favoured by Piketty, is to look at the economic flows.
To spare you the
algebra, the key measures are the capital/income ratio (the ratio of wealth to
GDP), the mortality rate (the proportion of the population that dies in any
year) and the ratio of average wealth at the time of death to the average
wealth of the living.
So if the
capital/income ratio is 600%, the mortality rate is 2%, and the dead are twice
as wealthy as the living, then the annual inheritance flow will be 600%x2%x2,
or 24% of national income.
As will be
apparent to those who watched an earlier TV equivalent to Downton Abbey,
Upstairs Downstairs, the importance of inherited wealth declined significantly
in the middle of the 20th century; the great landed estates fell into disrepair
or become tourist traps. As Mr Piketty shows, all three elements of his ratio
played a part. The capital/income ratio in Europe fell heavily; high taxes ruined
estates, inflation eroded holdings of government bonds and nationalisation
destroyed the value of holdings in equities. Mortality fell, so that in any
given year the proportion of inherited wealth declined. And the dead briefly
became less wealthy than the living.
If this last point
seems surprising, it is what the data from France (Mr Piketty's homeland)
shows. In 1913, the ratio of octagenarian wealth to that of fiftysomethings was
257%; by 1947, that ratio had dropped to 62%. If you lose your wealth in your
80s, you have no chance to rebuild it; at least fiftysomethings have a few
years of work left.
By the 1950s, the
idea that the best route to wealth was by inheritance (a commonplace of novels
by Jane Austen or Honore de Balzac) had vanished. Inheritances as a proportion
of national income fell from 24% to 1900 to around 4% by 1950. Another way of
looking at the issue is to look at the share of inherited wealth as a
proportion of total wealth; this was 90% before the First World War but fell to
45% by 1970. Meritocracy appeared to have triumphed.
But from the 1950s
onwards, two of Mr Piketty's factors started to shift back; the capital/income
ratio and the dead/living wealth ratio. Inheritances are back at 11% of French
national income. How will this change going forward? On Piketty's central
assumption of 1.7% annual economic growth and a 3% return on capital,
inheritance flows will rise to around 16-17% of national income by mid-century
and then stabilize. A more pessimistic view (1% growth rate and 5% return on
capital*) would see the ratio get back to 24-25% of national income, the
pre-1914 state. In this latter case, inherited wealth would be 90% of all
wealth.
The key point is
that if wealth is concentrated (as it is increasingly becoming) and if the return
on capital is high enough, then the wealth becomes self-perpetuating. Another
way of looking at the data, provided by Mr Piketty, is to see what fraction of
each birth cohort will receive a sum in the form of inherited wealth that is
larger than the lifetime income earned by the bottom 50% of the population.
Around 10% of those born in 1830 (who inherited in the late 19th century)
acheived this feat. Only 2% of those born in 1910 (whose parents thus died in
the 1950s) did so. The ratio is climbing again; Mr Piketty estimates that 12%
of those born in 1970 may cross this threshold.
Is France an
outlier? The reason Mr Piketty focuses on it is that the government has
collected very detailed data on wealth since the revolution. The German pattern
(in terms of inheritance flows, at least) looks fairly similar; Britain saw a
similarly big decline but has not seen the same rebound. (British pensions have
to be invested in annuities, which expire on death, and nursing home fees eat
up a high proportion of middle-class nest eggs.) The American data are not
great; but such evidence as there is suggests the cycle has been smoother. The
US was less unequal than France pre-1914, saw less of a battering for wealth in
the mid-20th century (the wars had less impact) and has seen a rebound but not
to French levels.
Finally, what
should we think about all this? Many people pay lip service to meritocracy but
get very het up about inheritance taxes, or death taxes as they like to call
them. It is often said that inheritance taxes represent double taxation but in
many cases that isn't true; for middle-class people, their biggest asset is
usually their home on which capital gains tax is not paid. Similarly, business
owners only pay capital gains tax when they sell; by definition, if they are
passing a company on to their heirs, they have not sold.
If one assumes
that an economy functions best if the most talented people rise to the top,
then inherited wealth rigs the deck. There is a lottery effect; if your parents
owned property, or die early (before they spend their savings on nursing care),
then you have a big advantage over others who may be just as hard-working or
talented. Wealthy people already pass on a lot of advantages to their children;
they can afford better education, and a better environment at home (more books,
quiet places to study etc).
History, as well
as fiction, suggests that being born to inherited wealth is not normally a spur
to greater effort; instead, life is devoted to social display or indolence. The
world hardly needs a new class of Bertie Woosters.
* Before anybody
complains that you can't get 5% these days, the return on capital for this
measure includes profits; much private wealth is in the form of ownership of
companies.
©The Economist Newspaper
Limited 2014
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