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2014年4月9日 星期三

2014/4/9 「東部大城鬧獨立 烏克蘭再陷分裂危機」

東部大城鬧獨立 烏克蘭再陷分裂危機

摘錄自:天下雜誌電子報                        2014/4/8
2014-04-08 Web only 作者:吳凱琳編譯

天下雜誌電子報 - 20140409 - 1
圖片來源:flickr.com/photos/mac_ivan/11038250935
 就在克里米亞脫離烏克蘭、加入俄羅斯之後,烏克蘭東部親俄地區,也開始蠢蠢欲動,期望仿效克里米亞模式,回歸俄羅斯。這使得長期動盪不安的烏克蘭,再次陷入分裂危機。

根據路透社報導,47日烏克蘭東部的三大城市:哈爾科夫(Kharkiv)、盧甘斯特(Lugansk)、頓內次克(Donetsk)的親俄群眾與武裝份子,分別佔領了城內政府建築物,要求舉辦公投,決定是否脫離烏克蘭獨立、加入俄羅斯。其中頓內次克的示威者宣布,成立「頓內次克人民共和國」,並要求俄羅斯派遣維和部隊到頓內次克,以免烏克蘭政府有所行動。

天下雜誌電子報 - 20140409 - 2

根據CNN最新報導,烏克蘭政府特種部隊已經從頓內次克武裝份子手中重新奪回被佔領的政府大樓。

東部三大城齊聲反抗,恐怕並非偶然,這很難不讓人聯想到,幕後操控一切的大內高手,是否正是莫斯科的普亭。

烏克蘭臨時總理耶森尤克(Arseny Yatseniuk)便公開表示,「反烏克蘭計劃已經開始進行,根據這項計劃,外國軍隊將會越過邊界,佔領烏克蘭領土。」耶森尤克進一步指出,俄羅斯政府的目的只有一個:「分裂和破壞烏克蘭」。烏克蘭臨時總統圖奇諾夫(Oleksander Turchinov)也公開指責俄羅斯,企圖複製克里米亞模式,但他絕不會允許這樣的情況發生。

根據《紐約時報》報導,多位政治分析專家認為,烏克蘭政局持續動盪,最符合俄羅斯當局利益,如此一來便可有效牽制烏克蘭政府,避免過度傾向西方,或是與西方國際組織簽訂任何協議。另一方面,抗議群眾意圖激怒烏克蘭政府,引發武力鎮壓,迫使俄羅斯政府必須出兵解圍,伸手援助過去曾屬於大俄羅斯版圖的國家。

不過,俄羅斯官方否認與東部的抗議活動有任何關聯,包括外交部長拉夫羅夫(Sergey V. Lavrov)則是鄭重表示,俄羅斯無意在烏克蘭東部採取軍事行動。稍後俄羅斯外交部發表正式聲明,重申烏克蘭採取聯邦制度的必要性,「唯有建立聯邦制度,才能確保烏克蘭境內各地區人民的利益,維持長久的穩定。」然而,一旦採取聯邦制度,等於是弱化基輔政府的權力,使得烏克蘭更容易被俄羅斯操控,而這是西方國家所不樂見的。

命運多舛的烏克蘭,將何去何從?最後的決定權恐怕不在烏克蘭自己手中,而是俄羅斯與歐美大國。(吳凱琳編譯)




2014年3月30日 星期日

2014/3/30 「資本主義為何成了貪污的幫兇?」

資本主義為何成了貪污的幫兇?

摘錄自:天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報                        2014/3/28


2014-03-17 Web only 作者:經濟學人

天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 - 20140330
圖片來源:flickr.com/photos/76657755@N04/
烏克蘭的問題政府一直操控在寡頭大亨之手,但在新興世界,政治和商業間的關係已越來越緊張。一如20世紀初的美國,新中產階級正在施展他們的力量,只不過這次是全球性現象;民眾想要清廉的政治人物,想要大亨在公平的條件下競爭,一場自資本家手中拯救資本主義的革命已經開始了。

利用政治關係賺取金錢,即為經濟學家所謂的「競租」,其範圍包括缺乏競爭、不良規範、低價將公共財產轉讓給企業等。在美國,這套系統在19世紀末到達頂點,而在新興世界,過去四分之一世紀對競租者來說有如美好時代。

資本主義以競租為基礎,不公平且有害長期成長。那會造成資源錯置、壓抑競爭,還有可能帶來嚴重貪汙。《經濟學人》建立了一套長期評斷各國裙帶資本主義程度的指數,其目的並非證實某國的貪汙特別嚴重,而是用以顯示,最有可能陷入裙帶主義的經濟部門之財富規模。

富有國家的表現相對好,不過,銀行援助將大量財富交至金融家之手,遊說團體影響力過高,今日的網路創業家也有可能成為明日的獨佔者。然而,新興世界的問題更為嚴重,富豪在高經濟租部門的財富,佔GDP比重為富有世界的2倍以上。

但這可能已經是競租的高峰,原因有三。其一,政府知道,唯有改善市場運作,並強化市場規範機構,才能讓國家富有、民眾滿意。其二,企業的財務誘因可能在改變;經濟富有之後,基礎建設和原物料的重要性也會下滑,例如,19001930年間,美國的新財富出自零售和汽車,而非鐵路和石油。

最後一個理由則是,政治人物的誘因也已經改變。成長大幅下滑,讓經濟改革變得極為重要;墨西哥等國家就是靠著政府推動改革,才減少了金融市場振盪的帶來影響。

該做的事還有很多。政府必須強化獨佔規範、促進競爭、確保公共標案及資產出售的透明化,並全力起訴貪汙者。經濟熱潮創造了企業大亨,也創造了他們的死敵,亦即教育程度良好、居於都會區的新中產階級;獨裁者和民選領袖都不該忽略這群人。(黃維德譯)

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014



The Economist

Business and government
The new age of crony capitalism

 By The Economist
 From The Economist
 Published: March 17, 2014

Mar 15th 2014 | From the print edition

Political connections have made many people hugely rich in recent years. But crony capitalism may be waning.

AS THE regime of Viktor Yanukovych collapsed in Ukraine, protesters against it could be found outside One Hyde Park, a luxury development in west London. Their target was Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest man and a backer of the old regime. "Discipline your pet", they chanted.

Ukraine's troubled state has long been dominated by its oligarchs. But across the emerging world the relationship between politics and business has become fraught. India's election in April and May will in part be a plebiscite on a decade of crony capitalism. Turkey's prime minister is engulfed by scandals involving construction firms—millions of Turks have clicked on YouTube recordings that purport to incriminate him. On March 5th China's president, Xi Jinping, vowed to act "without mercy" against corruption in an effort to placate public anger. Last year 182,000 officials were punished for disciplinary violations, an increase of 40,000 over 2011.

As in America at the turn of the 20th century, a new middle class is flexing its muscles, this time on a global scale. People want politicians who don't line their pockets, and tycoons who compete without favours. A revolution to save capitalism from the capitalists is under way.

The kind of rents estate agents can only dream of

"Rent-seeking" is what economists call a special type of money-making: the sort made possible by political connections. This can range from outright graft to a lack of competition, poor regulation and the transfer of public assets to firms at bargain prices. Well-placed people have made their fortunes this way ever since rulers had enough power to issue profitable licences, permits and contracts to their cronies. In America, this system reached its apogee in the late 19th century, and a long and partially successful struggle against robber barons ensued. Antitrust rules broke monopolies such as John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil. The flow of bribes to senators shrank.

In the emerging world, the past quarter-century has been great for rent-seekers. Soaring property prices have enriched developers who rely on approvals for projects. The commodities boom has inflated the value of oilfields and mines, which are invariably intertwined with the state. Some privatisations have let tycoons milk monopolies or get assets cheaply. The links between politics and wealth are plainly visible in China, where a third of billionaires are party members.

Capitalism based on rent-seeking is not just unfair, but also bad for long-term growth. As our briefing on India explains, resources are misallocated: crummy roads are often the work of crony firms. Competition is repressed: Mexicans pay too much for their phones. Dynamic new firms are stifled by better-connected incumbents. And if linked to the financing of politics, rent-heavy capitalism sets a tone at the top that can let petty graft flourish. When ministers are on the take, why shouldn't underpaid junior officials be?

The Economist has built an index to gauge the extent of crony capitalism across countries and over time. It identifies sectors which are particularly dependent on government—such as mining, oil and gas, banking and casinos—and tracks the wealth of billionaires (based on a ranking by Forbes) in those sectors relative to the size of the economy. It does not purport to establish that particular countries are particularly corrupt, but shows the scale of fortunes being created in economic sectors that are most susceptible to cronyism.

Rich countries score comparatively well, but that is no reason for complacency. The bailing out of banks has involved the transfer of a great deal of wealth to financiers; lobbyists have too much influence, especially in America; today's internet entrepreneurs could yet become tomorrow's monopolists. The larger problem, though, lies in the emerging world, where billionaires' wealth in rent-heavy sectors relative to GDP is more than twice as high as in the rich world. Ukraine and Russia score particularly badly—many privatisations favoured insiders. Asia's boom has enriched tycoons in rent-seeking sectors.

Wanted: emerging-market Roosevelts

Yet this may be a high-water mark for rent-seekers, for three reasons. First, rules are ignored less freely than they used to be. Governments seeking to make their countries rich and keep people happy know they need to make markets work better and bolster the institutions that regulate them. Brazil, Hong Kong and India have beefed up their antitrust regulators. Mexico's president, Enrique Peña Nieto, wants to break its telecoms and media cartels. China is keen to tackle its state-owned fiefs.

Second, the financial incentives for businesses may be changing. The share of billionaire wealth from rent-rich industries in emerging markets is now falling, from a peak of 76% in 2008 to 58% today. This is partly a natural progression. As economies get richer, infrastructure and commodities become less dominant. Between 1900 and 1930 new fortunes in America were built not in railways and oil but in retailing and cars. In China today the big money is made from the internet, not building heavy industrial plants with subsidised loans on land secured through party connections. But this also reflects the wariness of investors: in India, after a decade of epic corruption, industrialists in open and innovative sectors such as technology and pharmaceuticals are back in the ascendant.

The last reason for optimism is that the incentives for politicians have changed, too. Growth has slowed sharply, making reforms that open the economy vital. Countries with governments that are reforming and trying to tackle vested interests, such as Mexico, have been better insulated from the jitters in the financial markets.

There is much more to be done. Governments need to be more assiduous in regulating monopolies, in promoting competition, in ensuring that public tenders and asset sales are transparent and in prosecuting bribe-takers. The boom that created a new class of tycoon has also created its nemesis, a new, educated, urban, taxpaying middle class that is pushing for change. That is something autocrats and elected leaders ignore at their peril.





2014年3月23日 星期日

2014/3/23 「國際速讀/9成民意支持!克里米亞公投入俄的影響」


國際速讀/9成民意支持!克里米亞公投入俄的影響

摘錄自:天下雜誌電子報                        2014/3/18
2014-03-18 Web only 作者:吳凱琳編譯
天下雜誌電子報 - 20140323
圖片來源:黃明堂(圖為交接中的莫斯科紅場衛兵)

317日,克里米亞公投有了明確的結果,境內俄羅斯人佔多數的克里米亞,公投結果早在意料之中。但這個結果,會帶來哪些影響?以下3分鐘解讀這次公投的內容與後續效應。

Q:公投的最後結果是什麼?

A:高達83%的投票率,其中有93%的人表示支持克里米亞脫離烏克蘭獨立,並立即申請加入俄羅斯聯邦;此外,烏克蘭在當地的國有財產都將被克里米亞政府「收歸國有」。

克里米亞議會宣布,克里米亞成為主權獨立的國家,命名為克里米亞共和國,同時議會正式向俄羅斯提出申請,加入俄羅斯聯邦。

Q:這次公投的選項內容是什麼?

A:第一個選項:你是否支持克里米亞加入俄羅斯,成為俄羅斯的一部分?第二個選項:你是否支持恢復1992年憲法,克里米亞仍舊是烏克蘭一部分?(不過,所謂「恢復1992年憲法,並未指明是宣稱克里米亞獨立的原始憲法版本,或是承認克里米亞為烏克蘭境內自治共和國的修改版本。」)

Q:其他國家對於克里米亞公投結果的態度是?

A:俄國總統普丁已經簽署總統令,承認克里米亞為主權獨立國家;俄國國會下院將於近期內通過法案,讓克里米亞正式加入俄羅斯。

烏克蘭臨時政府已表態不承認克里米亞的公投,認為這次的公投違法,同時緊急徵召後備軍人入伍,以防俄羅斯入侵。

此外,包括英、美、法、德、日、義大利、加拿大等7大工業國,均不承認克里米亞公投結果;歐盟也發表聲明,不承認公投結果。

美國針對7位俄羅斯高級官員和國會議員進行制裁,制裁措施包括凍結在美國的財產與資產;歐盟也宣布,針對21名俄羅斯和克里米亞官員進行制裁,包括旅行禁令與資產凍結。

Q:對中亞地區的政治局勢有什麼影響?

A:對克里米亞而言,脫離烏克蘭獨立,加入俄羅斯,或許順了多數民意,經濟上也可能受惠於俄羅斯的援助而有更好的發展;但是,過去以來,克里米亞的電力和能源高度依賴烏克蘭,如今脫離烏克蘭獨立,短期內一般的民生需求勢必會受到影響。

對烏克蘭而言,臨時政府如今正式與俄羅斯分道揚鑣,往歐美靠攏,但這樣的決定也並未受到所有人民的支持,烏克蘭境內仍有不少親俄人士要求比照克里米亞,舉辦公投,臨時政府是否能穩定國內政局,避免再有紛爭,至今也很難有百分之百的把握。

對俄羅斯而言,贏得克里米亞加入,自然也守住了俄羅斯在黑海的軍事要塞,同時也有助於普丁在國內的支持率。然而,另一方面,烏克蘭倒向歐美,俄羅斯失去對烏克蘭的影響力,也意味著俄羅斯在中亞南部的影響力擴張受阻。

普丁最重要的政治企圖是建立歐亞經濟共同體(Eurasian Economic Union),與歐盟相抗衡,莫斯科當局一直希望烏克蘭加入,避免倒向歐盟,但如今歐亞經濟共同體的夢想已暫時受阻。(吳凱琳編譯)




2014年3月16日 星期日

2014/3/16 「政治之外 烏克蘭經濟債台高築」

政治之外 烏克蘭經濟債台高築

摘錄自:天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報                        2014/3/14
2014-03-06Web only 作者:經濟學人

天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 - 20140316
圖片來源:flickr.com/photos/112078056@N07/

克蘭不是只有政治問題。1月中之前,烏克蘭幣兌美元匯率固定為81,現在約為101政府最近發行了利率最高達15%的短期債務,其債券表現就和委內瑞拉一樣差;許多分析師擔心,烏克蘭可能很快就會無力支付其債務。

經濟混亂反映了近期的政治不穩定,但烏克蘭的經濟問題並非一日之寒;經濟政策不佳、不願改革與貪汙,合力拉垮了烏克蘭。後蘇聯時代初期,烏克蘭經濟的生產力極差,也和多數前蘇聯國家一樣,遭逢產出大減和通膨劇增,但烏克蘭受創格外嚴重。

烏克蘭經濟於2000年初期穩住腳步,資本回流也讓貨幣供給快速成長,自20012010年,廣義貨幣年增率達35%。20062007年信貸平均成長幅度為73%,資產開始顯得極度泡沫化,高通膨亦傷害了烏克蘭的出口競爭力。

全球危機過後、歐元危機加劇之際,烏克蘭遇上了資金乾枯,為烏克蘭幣帶來強大的下壓力。捍衛貨幣大大消耗央行儲備,自2011年高點400億美元降至約120億美元;上個月,央行承認敗戰,不再控制匯率。貨幣貶值雖有必要,短期內勢必會讓烏克蘭十分頭痛;約半數公債為外幣計價,貨幣貶值會讓烏克蘭的債務負擔更加沉重。

過去,烏克蘭一直不願推動改革。2010年,IMF同意向烏克蘭提供150 億美元有條件貸款。改革的重大目標之一,即為重度能源補助;國營天然氣公司Naftogaz向消費者收取的價格,僅達進口天然氣成本的四分之一。最終,烏克蘭無法處理能源補助,IMF2011年凍結此協議。

其他領域的改革也不夠實在。烏克蘭雖然達成了2011年的減赤目標,靠的卻是減少資本支出,在此同時,薪資和退休金則過度支出;那實在不是達成永續經濟成長之道。貪汙和治理不善亦是重大問題;根據IMF研究,烏克蘭地下經濟約為GDP50%。地下企業通常不繳稅,進一步減少了政府的資金。

目前,烏克蘭並不是非常擔心經濟問題。不過,烏克蘭今年得找出約250億美元,以處理巨額經常帳赤字和外債;外匯存底僅餘120億美元,無力償債當然有可能發生。等到危機真的結束,烏克蘭一定得處理經濟倒退這個問題才行。(黃維德譯)

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014



The Economist

Ukraine and Russia
Why is Ukraine's economy in such a mess?

By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: March 06, 2014

Mar 5th 2014, 11:22 by C.W. | LONDON

UKRAINE'S problems are not just political. In recent weeks its economy has taken a hammering. Until mid-January its currency, the hryvnia, was fixed at 8:1 with the dollar; it now trades at about 10:1. The government has recently issued short-term debt at interest rates as high as 15%; this year its bonds have done about as badly as Venezuela's. Many analysts are worried that the country will soon default on its debt.

The economic turmoil reflects recent political instability. But Ukraine's economic problems were long in the making. Dodgy economic policy, distaste for reform and endemic corruption have brought the country to its knees.

In the immediate post-Soviet era Ukraine was a massively unproductive economy. Like most former Soviet republics it suffered huge output declines and soaring inflation. but Ukraine was among the hardest hit of the lot. Hyperinflation in the early 1990s resulted from lack of access to financial markets and massive monetary expansion to finance government spending, in the face of sharply declining output. The Ukrainian population was scarred by the experience of hyperinflation. In response, in 1996 the Ukrainian central bank replaced the old currency, the karbovanets, with the hryvnia and pledged to keep it stable in relation to the dollar. The currency continued to wobble through the late 1990s, however, and particular amid the Russian rouble crisis of 1998.

Both Russia and Ukraine stabilised by the early 2000s. Capital flowed back, attracted in part by relatively high interest rates (the early 2000s, when the Fed pushed its main interest rate down to 1% for an extended period were a rehearsal of sorts for the post-crisis environment). As foreign cash flooded in the money supply grew rapidly: from 2001 to 2010 broad money increased at an annual rate of 35%. In 2006 and 2007 credit growth averaged 73%. Assets began to look extraordinarily bubbly and high inflation damaged Ukraine's export competitiveness.

After the global crisis, and as the euro crisis intensified, Ukraine suffered from a drought in capital flows (along with much of central and eastern Europe) which placed strong downward pressure on the hryvnia. Protecting the currency drained the central bank's reserves, which tumbled from a high of $40 billion in 2011 to about $12 billion today. Last month the central bank admitted defeat and let the currency go. Currency depreciation, while necessary, will be an economic headache for Ukraine in the short term. About half of its public debt is in foreign currencies: as the hrvynia loses value, Ukraine's debt burden rises. Debt financing has also become more difficult as a result of the Federal Reserve's "taper", which has wrong-footed many emerging markets by stanching the previously steady flow of capital in their direction.

Ukraine has proven reluctant to engage in reform. For a while it felt as if it didn't need to: high commodity prices during the 2000s supported growth. Many of Ukraine's exports went to Russia, a country that was also doing well on the back of high oil prices. But Ukraine was badly hit by the financial crisis and plummeting steel prices. GDP fell by 15% in 2009. That made it a prime candidate for economic streamlining. In 2010 the IMF agreed to loan Ukraine $15 billion—with conditions attached. A major target for reform were Ukraine's cushy energy subsidies. The state gas company, Naftogaz, only charges consumers a quarter of the cost of importing the gas. Cheap gas discourages investment: Ukraine is one of the most energy-intensive economies in the world and domestic production has slumped by two-thirds since the 1970s. The IMF ended up freezing the deal in 2011 after Kiev failed to touch the costly subsidies.

In other areas reform has been half-hearted. The government did meet its public deficit target of 2.8% of GDP in 2011. Yet this was achieved by skimping on capital expenditures while overspending on wages and pensions: hardly the recipe for sustainable economic growth. Progressively lowering the rate of corporation tax has also weakened the state's finances.

Corruption and poor governance are other major problems. The Ukrainian shadow economy is one of the biggest in the world—at around 50% of GDP, according to IMF research. Businesses operating underground tend not to pay taxes, further depriving the government of funds. And last week Ukraine's new prime minister estimated that $37 billion had gone missing during Viktor Yanukovych's rule.

Right now Ukraine is not too worried about improving economic management. But big bills are imminent: Ukraine needs to find about $25 billion this year to finance its large current-account deficit and to meet foreign creditors. Foreign-exchange reserves are only $12 billion. Default is certainly on the cards. When the crisis does end, addressing its economic backwardness must be a major objective.

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014



2014/3/16 「普丁真正的毀滅性武器是金融」

普丁真正的毀滅性武器是金融

一天損失1.7兆元的軍事演習 只是烏克蘭危機序曲

摘錄自:今周刊電子報                            2014/3/12
今周刊.撰文:鄭超文

今周刊電子報 - 20140316

烏克蘭三月十六日將舉行克里米亞獨立公投,俄羅斯總統普丁絕對不讓烏克蘭投向歐盟懷抱。他掌握的勝算籌碼,不是擁有核彈的軍事實力,而是足以讓歐洲金融崩潰的五千億美元外匯存底,以及俄羅斯權貴與歐洲金融界的緊密關係。







俄羅斯大獨裁者普丁,為了抓住人口只有兩百萬人的克里米亞半島,一不小心將自己放到全世界政治軍事傾軋的靶心。如今,這個從肉體到心靈都極為強悍、什麼都不怕的獨裁者,正面臨人生最大的一場考驗,只要一個閃神,不只自己將會粉身碎骨,還會拉著他的俄羅斯帝國一同陪葬。

但是,普丁不會怯戰,失去了烏克蘭的俄羅斯帝國,將淪為遙遠北方的二流勢力,正如同中國絕不放棄台灣,普丁也絕對不會讓烏克蘭叛逃到歐盟的懷抱中。

更何況,普丁王朝不僅牢牢掌握著俄羅斯政治經濟的資源,他們的貪腐資金灌滿了歐洲銀行的金庫、他們的妻子買飽了倫敦與巴黎最奢華的豪宅,俄羅斯與歐洲的金融利益早已如膠似漆。普丁手上的經濟金融籌碼,跟他軍火庫中的核子飛彈,同樣是足以摧毀全球安定的毀滅性武器,所以普丁當然不會怯戰。

對決股市金融 俄損失慘重

就在今年三月一日星期六,俄羅斯國會授權普丁對克里米亞出兵,普丁隨即展開讓外界搞不清楚是侵略、還是演習的軍事行動。雖然動用軍隊的規模很小,卻立刻引起以德國為首的歐盟,聯手美國總統歐巴馬的強烈反應,引發外交、軍事、經濟全面的國際對峙。

外界擔憂的軍事衝突並未發生,真正的對決發生在金融市場。三月三日星期一,俄羅斯股市暴跌一一%、隨後開市的德國股市跌了三.三%,倫敦與紐約則以下挫一.五%收盤,金融市場對決的結果勝負立見,美國與德國雖然重傷,俄羅斯卻大敗。兩天之後,普丁將部隊撤回俄羅斯境內的軍事基地,重回談判桌。

三月三日俄羅斯股市總市值一天蒸發五八四億美元(約新台幣一兆七千七百億元),相當於台灣一整年的中央政府總收入。三月一日出兵前的俄羅斯股市總市值,還有五七五○億美元,到了三月三日剩下五一二○億美元,損失比金融海嘯時期還慘烈。

更糟的是,普丁最大的財庫OAO Gazprom國營獨占石油氣公司,當天暴跌了一四%,而最大的銀行Sberbank則崩跌一五%。普丁進軍克里米亞的決策,堪稱史上最昂貴的、損失最慘重的軍演。

三月三日股市暴跌只是一個「小小的電擊」,曾貴為金磚四國、受到投資人追捧的俄羅斯早已疲態畢露,持續第三年承受資金外流的壓力。資金外流不僅來自於歐美外資,也來自於普丁培養出來的權貴大亨們。

俄羅斯盧布兌美元的匯價,與一年前相比重貶了一八%,其中有一一%來自於過去三個月內的資金外逃。如果軍事衝突升高,總金額超過千億美元的歐元債券、俄羅斯違約交換合約、OFZ聯邦政府債券(盧布計價的俄羅斯聯邦政府債券)都可能面臨賣出的壓力,造成俄羅斯全面的金融危機。

普丁在千禧年前從葉爾欽手中接下政權,二○○○年五月正式出任俄羅斯總統,前面七年藉著能源輸出,為俄羅斯蓄積了龐大的財富,在金融海嘯之前,俄羅斯外匯存底一度逼近六千億美元。但是,金融海嘯改變了全球的金融生態,俄羅斯的能源魔法就此消失,經濟成長日益疲弱、通貨膨脹從一二年的三%,突然向上跳升,去年年中已經翻倍到七.四%。

一二年是普丁王朝經濟實力盛極而衰的關鍵,當年經濟成長停滯、通貨膨脹劇揚、外匯存底開始下滑,海外負債卻反向暴增。

俄羅斯外匯存底到今年元月已經跌破五千億美元關卡,政府外債則一路向上狂飆,一二年底已經累積了六千一百億美元的外債,比當年的外匯存底高一六%;去年外債又新增一千三百億美元,累計七三二○億美元的外債,是外匯存底的一.五倍,外債比外匯存底多透支了兩千三百億美元。

(資料來源:今周刊899期!)


2014年3月8日 星期六

2014/3/8 「4大重點速解:為什麼俄羅斯出兵,選擇克里米亞」

4大重點速解:為什麼俄羅斯出兵,選擇克里米亞

摘錄自:天下雜誌電子報                        2014/3/4
2014-03-03 Web only 作者:吳凱琳編譯


天下雜誌電子報 - 20140308 - 1
圖片來源:flickr.com/photos/112078056@N07/12192650456
俄羅斯總統普丁於31日向國會上議院提出派遣軍隊至烏克蘭的請求,保護俄羅斯居民以及軍事人員的安全,上議院也已同意普丁的請求。首當其衝的便是位於烏克蘭南方的克里米亞,俄國軍隊已經接管克里米亞地區重要的戰略地點。

自古以來,克里米亞便是兵家必爭的戰略要地,19世紀曾發生著名的克里米亞戰爭,為了爭奪巴爾幹半島主權,俄國與英國、法國、土耳其以及薩丁王國宣戰;大家耳熟能詳的白衣天使南丁格爾,便是在克里米亞戰爭期間照顧傷兵,並因此奠定了現代化護士制度的基礎而得名。

如今,因為烏克蘭政治危機,克里米亞再度成了國際新聞的焦點。這個位於黑海的半島,究竟是什麼樣的地方?具有什麼樣的重要性?

◎克里米亞地理圖

天下雜誌電子報 - 20140308 - 2


1.人口以俄羅斯人佔多數:目前克里米亞的居民大約有200萬人(台北市約為260萬),根據最新統計,58%為俄羅斯人,24%為烏克蘭人,12%為克里米亞韃靼人;克里米亞韃靼人在1944年時曾被史達林集體流放到中亞與西伯利亞,一直到1991年蘇聯瓦解後,才陸續回到克里米亞。官方語言為烏克蘭語,但多數居民說俄語。

2.烏克蘭境內唯一的自治共和國:1783年,俄國兼併克里米亞;直到1954年,前蘇聯領袖赫魯雪夫將克里米亞劃歸為當時為蘇聯加盟共和國之一的烏克蘭。1991年,蘇聯解體後,烏克蘭獨立,克里米亞屬於烏克蘭的一部分。

1992年,克里米亞曾短暫宣布獨立,但隨後與烏克蘭達成協議,成為烏克蘭內自治共和國。在法理上,克里米亞仍屬於烏克蘭領土的一部分。

克里米亞有自己的國會,但是總理的任命必須經過烏克蘭總統的同意。克里米亞的憲法不得抵觸烏克蘭憲法,而且僅限於克里米亞自治區內有效。過去10年,克里米亞議會均是由烏克蘭前總統亞努科維奇領導的地區黨所把持。

今年2月底,一批支持俄羅斯的武裝份子突襲並佔領克里米亞議會,並片面宣佈由俄羅斯團結黨(Russian Unity)領袖阿克瑟諾夫(Sergei Aksyonov)擔任克里米亞總理,俄羅斯團結黨主張烏克蘭應與俄羅斯建立更緊密的經濟與軍事合作。

3.渴望脫離烏克蘭獨立:俄羅斯人佔多數的克里米亞,境內多數居民的政治立場也比較傾向支持俄羅斯,甚至有人希望脫離烏克蘭,成為俄羅斯的一部分。親俄派認為親俄的前烏克蘭總統亞努科維奇是政變的受害者。因此,克里米亞境內的分離主義份子,一直試圖推動獨立公投,希望能脫離烏克蘭獨立。

4.俄羅斯海軍基地所在:克里米亞西南岸的塞瓦斯托波爾(Sevastopol)是俄羅斯海軍基地所在,面向黑海,俄羅斯的黑海艦隊駐紮於此已有230年的歷史,是俄羅斯穩固它在地中海、巴爾幹半島、中東地區影響力的關鍵。依照俄羅斯與烏克蘭簽訂的租借協議,軍隊若要移往基地之外,必須獲得烏克蘭政府的同意。

2010年,雙方達成協議,基地的使用期限延長至2042年;另一方面,烏克蘭向俄羅斯購買天然氣,可享有30%的折扣優惠,未來10年烏克蘭將可因此省下400億美元的費用。

正因如此,隨著親俄的亞努科維奇垮台,俄羅斯急欲出兵克里米亞,避免此區落入烏克蘭反對派勢力的手中。

◎互動圖表:烏克蘭政治危機大事紀(若您無法閱讀,請點此