美國財富成長果實流向1％富豪
摘錄自：天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 2013/2/14
2014-02-06 Web only 作者：經濟學人
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| 圖片來源：flickr.com/photos/tracy_olson/ |
幾乎每個美國人都同意，社會流動性減低並非好事。歐巴馬在1月28日的國情咨文中詳述了「機會階梯」之衰退，共和黨重要人物萊恩（Paul Ryan）和魯比奧（Marco Rubio）最近也在演說中批評社會流動性下滑。
然而，就在兩黨找出共識之時，有項新研究顯示此看法可能是錯的。本研究出自哈佛和柏克萊的經濟學家群，其規模遠超出過去的社會流動性研究；他們利用出生於1971～1993年、超過4,000萬人的退稅資料，將焦點放在世代間的流動性差異，並以數種方式衡量流動性。
結果發現，各項指標都沒有太大改變。1971年時，出生在最窮五分之一家庭的小孩，有8.4％的機會晉升至最富裕的五分之一；而對1986年出生的小孩來說，機會為9％。
此研究結果極為轟動，最重要的原因就是它與大眾的認知相反；近期的蓋洛普民調發現，只有52％的美國人認為一般人擁有許多向上流動的機會，1998年時則為81％。它也與間接證據相反；數項研究指出，學校水準等因素造成了貧富差距擴大，而這些因素應該也會影響社會流動性。
到底是怎麼回事呢？最有可能的答案是，美國財富不均的主要特質是流向最富有1％的收入比例快速上升，而少部分精英擁有巨量財富，和民眾在其他階層間流動的相關性可能並不高──至少目前是如此。
無論原因為何，就此寬心可能並非明智之舉。其一，由於貧富差距擴大，出生在富貴或貧窮家庭的影響也會變得更大。其二，若成長的果實大多落入富人之手，將使其他人的處境更加不利。
其三，雖然社會流動性與過去差異不大，各地的流動性仍大有不同。研究者在第二份論文中研究了各地區的稅務統計資料，結果發現，在加州聖荷西最窮五分之一家庭出生的小孩，有12.9％的機會升上頂層，而北卡州夏洛特僅4.4％，遠低於其他富有世界。
研究者也發現，在住宅區整合性較高、學校品質佳、家庭穩固、社群精神充沛、中產階級財富差距小的地方，社會流動性也比較高；這對政治人物來說是個值得推動的議題，但前提是他們得知道該怎麼做。（黃維德譯）
©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014
The Economist
Class
in America
Mobility,
measured
By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: February 06, 2014
Feb 1st 2014 | WASHINGTON, DC | From the print edition
America is no less socially mobile than it was a generation ago.
AMERICANS are deeply divided as to whether widening inequality is a
problem, let alone what the government should do about it. Some are appalled
that Bill Gates has so much money; others say good luck to him. But nearly
everyone agrees that declining social mobility is a bad thing. Barack Obama's
state-of-the-union speech on January 28th dwelt on how America's "ladders
of opportunity" were failing (see article). Paul Ryan and Marco Rubio, two
leading Republicans, recently gave speeches decrying social immobility and
demanding more effort to ensure poor people who work hard can better their lot.
Just as the two sides have found something to agree on, however, a new
study suggests the conventional wisdom may be wrong. Despite huge increases in
inequality, America may be no less mobile a society than it was 40 years ago.
The study, by a clutch of economists at Harvard University and the
University of California, Berkeley, is far bigger than any previous effort to
measure social mobility. The economists crunch numbers from over 40m tax
returns of people born between 1971 and 1993 (with all identifying information
removed). They focus on mobility between generations and use several ways to
measure it, including the correlation of parents' and children's income, and
the odds that a child born into the bottom fifth of the income distribution
will climb all the way up to the top fifth.
They find that none of these measures has changed much (see chart). In
1971 a child from the poorest fifth had an 8.4% chance of making it to the top
quintile. For a child born in 1986 the odds were 9%. The study confirms
previous findings that America's social mobility is low compared with many
European countries. (In Denmark, a poor child has twice as much chance of
making it to the top quintile as in America.) But it challenges several smaller
recent studies that concluded that America had become less socially mobile.
This result has caused a huge stir, not least because it runs counter
to public perceptions. A recent Gallup poll found that only 52% of Americans
think there is plenty of opportunity for the average Joe to get ahead, down
from 81% in 1998. It also jars with other circumstantial evidence. Several
studies point to widening gaps between rich and poor in the kinds of factors
you would expect to influence mobility, such as the quality of schools or
parents' investment of time and money in their children. Cross-country analyses
also suggest there is an inverse relationship between income inequality and
social mobility—a phenomenon that has become known as the "Great
Gatsby" curve.
What is going on? One possibility is that social stratification takes
time to become entrenched. In a new book, Gregory Clark, an economic historian
at the University of California, Davis, who tracks mobility over hundreds of
years by following surnames, reaches far more pessimistic conclusions (see
article). Another, sunnier, explanation is that even as income gaps have
widened over the past 30 years, other barriers to mobility, such as
discrimination against women and blacks, have fallen.
Most likely, the answer lies in the nature of America's inequality,
whose main characteristic is the soaring share of overall income going to the
top 1% (from 10% in 1980 to 22% in 2012). The correlation between vast wealth
accruing to a tiny elite and the ability of people to move between the rest of
the rungs of the income ladder may be small—at least for now.
Whatever the explanation, it would be unwise to take much comfort from
this study. For a start, since the gap between top and bottom has widened, the
consequences of an accident of birth have become bigger. Second, if the gains
of growth are going mostly to those at the top, that bodes ill for those whose
skills are less in demand. Many economists worry that living standards for the
non-elite will stagnate for a long time.
Is your town a launchpad or a swamp?
Third, although social mobility has not changed much over time, it
varies widely from place to place. In a second paper, the economists crunch
their tax statistics by region. They find that the probability of a child born
into the poorest fifth of the population in San Jose, California making it to
the top is 12.9%, not much lower than in Denmark. In Charlotte, North Carolina
it is 4.4%, far lower than anywhere else in the rich world.
This geographic prism also offers some pointers on what influences
mobility. The economists found five factors that were correlated with
differences in social mobility in different parts of America: residential
segregation (whether by income or race); the quality of schooling; family
structure (eg, how many children live with only one parent); "social capital"
(such as taking part in community groups); and inequality (particularly income
gaps among those outside the top 1%). Social mobility is higher in integrated
places with good schools, strong families, lots of community spirit and smaller
income gaps within the broad middle class. Not a bad agenda for politicians to
push, if only they knew how.
The risk for the Kremlin is not mass protests, but the exploitation of
this discontent by the elites for their own political and economic ends, just
as their predecessors did at the end of the Soviet era. Mr Putin's idea of
centralised "vertical power" is popular with regional governors when
money flows down from the top; less so when Moscow tries to extract money from
them and leaves them with discontented populations and welfare burdens they
cannot support. At this point, the idea of centralisation starts to lose its
appeal and it is every local baron for himself.
Recent opinion polls and Mr Dmitriev's focus groups, held outside
Moscow and other big cities, confirm a growing demand for decentralisation,
government accountability, an independent judiciary, a free media and the right
to protest. All this chimes with the feelings of the middle class in the
cities. In the mid-1980s it was precisely that combination of widespread
popular dissatisfaction and discontent among the elites that shook the Soviet
system. In the end, the Soviet Union fell apart not because of mass street
protests, but because the nomenklatura no longer saw any economic benefit in
defending the regime.
How long will it take before that is true again? To return to Gogol,
"Rus, where are you speeding to? Answer! It gives no answer. The little
carriage bell peals with a magical ring…The air, torn into pieces, roars and
becomes wind."
From the print edition: Briefing
©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014
