生育率大減 亞洲人口優勢消失
摘錄自：天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 2013/1/3
2013-12-27 Web only 作者：經濟學人
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| 圖片來源：flickr.com/photos/worldbank/ |
過去半個世紀，家庭人數減少對人類產生了極為深遠的影響。這股變動將於2014年（或2014年左右）到達新的里程碑。在亞洲這塊全球人口最多的大陸，總生育率將降至2.1；生育率即女性一生預期會生育的小孩數量，2.1是個魔術數字的原因在於，要是生育率維持在2.1，人口將處於長期平衡（又稱人口替代率）。
無法確知亞洲的生育率何時會降至人口替代率，聯合國認為此事會在2015～2020年間發生，但中國人口專家認為聯合國大幅高估了中國的生育率，因此2014年是個相當合理的猜測。
全球各地的生育率都在下降，但亞洲十分特別，原因有二；其一，亞洲擁有43億人口，佔了全球一半以上。其二，亞洲生育率的降幅比表面上要高，因為中東地區拉高了平均生育率。在亞洲人口密集之處，生育率的降幅高於平均；東亞生育率僅1.7，較替代率低了許多。部分地區的降幅亦極為劇烈，例如孟加拉在1970年時的生育率為6.9，30年後已降至2.9。
生育率下降十分重要，因為那與更高的教育水準（子女數量少，家長也就更能負擔他們的教育）、更高的生活水準（勞工教育程度較高）、更高的女性自主程度（女性可以工作，不必將所有時間花在養育子女）有關。生育率下滑之際，各國亦取得了「人口紅利」；部分估計認為，亞洲過去50年間的經濟成長，四分之一出自人口模式帶來的優勢。
但生育率降至替代率之下會導致兩個問題，亞洲也碰上了這兩個問題。第一個問題是人口優勢的利益開始消失。中國預估，2010～2020年間，中國15～59歲的人口將減少3,000萬；那是核心工作人口，因此中國已然面臨勞力供給下滑和薪資上升壓力。
另一個問題則是，部分國家會陷入極低生育率趨勢，生育率降至1.5或更低，並停留在那裡數個世代；德國已經如此，日本和俄羅斯即將如此，中國也很有可能變成這樣。中國的生育率已低於替代率超過20年，一胎化亦早已打破了傳統想法中的家庭規模，由於性擇墮胎，接下來20年，中國的育齡女性也會比較少。從2014年開始，中國領導者將面臨取消或大幅削弱一胎化政策的壓力。（黃維德譯）
©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2013
The Economist
Asia
From baby boom
to bust
By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: December 27, 2013
Nov 18th 2013 | From The World In 2014 print edition
Crashing fertility will transform the Asian family.
Over the past half-century the most profound influence upon the great
majority of humankind has been the vast and gentle decline in the size of
families. In 2014 (or thereabouts—such things are approximate) this huge change
will reach a milestone. In the world's most populous continent, Asia, the total
fertility rate will fall to 2.1. The rate is the number of children a woman can
expect to bear during her lifetime and 2.1 is a magic number because, if
sustained, it produces long-term equilibrium in the population (it is known as
the replacement rate). In 1960 Asia's average fertility was 5.8.
The exact point at which fertility reaches replacement cannot be known
for sure. The United Nations Population Division thinks it will happen at some
point during 2015-20. But Chinese demographers think the UN is significantly
overestimating China's fertility rate, so 2014 is a reasonable guess.
The fall in fertility has taken place worldwide. Latin America has
experienced a decline almost exactly as great as Asia's. But Asia is special
for two reasons. First, with a population of 4.3 billion it is home to over
half the world's people. Latin America's population is only one-seventh that of
Asia.
Second, the fall in Asia has been greater than it might appear because
the continental average has been buoyed by relatively high fertility in the
Middle East. The fertility decline in the heavily populated areas of Asia has
been greater. East Asian fertility has fallen to just 1.7, well below
replacement. The decline in some places has been as sharp as any country has
ever experienced. Bangladesh's rate fell from 6.9 to 2.9 in the 30 years after
1970. Iran (a Middle Eastern outlier) saw its rate crash from 6.5 in 1980 to
1.9 in 2005. Social transformations do not get more dramatic.
China is already experiencing a dwindling labour supply
Falling fertility matters because it is associated with higher
standards of education (since parents can more easily afford to educate
children when there are fewer of them); higher living standards (since workers
are better educated); and somewhat greater female autonomy (women can go to
work rather than spend all their time nurturing children). As fertility falls,
countries reap what is called a "demographic dividend", the potential
economic advantage that comes from having relatively fewer children and old
people, and a bulge of working-age adults. On some estimates, a quarter of
Asia's economic growth over the past 50 years has come from its favourable
demographic pattern.
Missing the children already
But as fertility falls below the replacement rate, two problems emerge,
and Asia is facing both of them. One is that the economic advantages of
favourable demography begin to dwindle. Between 2010 and 2020, according to the
Chinese, the number of people aged between 15 and 59 in the country can be
expected to decline by 30m. This is the core working-age population, so China
is already experiencing a diminishing labour supply and upward pressure on
wages.
The other problem is that some countries (not all) slip into a pattern
of very low fertility in which the rate falls towards 1.5 or less, and stays
there for generations as social norms shift and people abandon the common ideal
of a two-child family. This happened in Germany, is happening in Japan and
Russia, and could well happen in China, where the fertility rate has been below
replacement for over 20 years and the one-child policy has long assailed
traditional ideas about family size. Sex-selective abortions mean there will be
fewer Chinese women of child-bearing age over the next 20 years, because
millions of female fetuses were aborted over the past 20 as parents sought to
ensure that their one child was a son. In 2014 and beyond, the country's
leaders will face pressure to scrap or drastically dilute the one-child policy.
©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2013
