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2014年5月10日 星期六

2014/5/10 「屌絲──中國社會幻滅的上班族」

屌絲──中國社會幻滅的上班族

摘錄自:天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報                        2014/5/9
2014-04-25 Web only 作者:經濟學人

天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 - 20140510 - 1
圖片來源:天下雜誌(設計圖片)
 從文件來看,25歲的朱光(音譯)應該是中國經濟裡的未來贏家:他是上海工廠工人的獨生子,大學畢業,在聯想工作。但朱光認為自己是個輸家;他在公司餐廳吃飯,晚上回到20平方公尺大的出租房間玩線上遊戲,沒有女朋友,也沒有機會交到女朋友。他和許多人一樣,稱自己為「屌絲」。

一般人越來越難在中國經濟中獲取成功;屌絲象徵著無力感,這個詞一直到最近在出現,吸引了中國各地的上班族,特別是IT產業。屌絲多為男性,通常是社交能力不佳、沉迷於線上遊戲的空想家。他們成為屌絲,大多不是出於自己的選擇,而是社會幫他們作出了選擇;幾項研究顯示,中國社會的收入持續增加,但社會流動性卻惡化了。

朱光表示,因為他是工廠工人的小孩,所以他是屌絲。他不是富二代或官二代,他和他的屌絲同事認為,要是有錢或有關係,他們可以念更好的大學、找更好的工作。

朱光的稅後年收入近8,000美元,輕易地超越了許多中國人;他是張江高科技園區的低薪族,但許多收入更高的人也覺得自己是屌絲。他們的薪資甚至高於上海的平均,但成功表象的成本實在太高;他們成不了高富帥,也不可能與白富美結婚。

這在快速發展的經濟中似乎相當尋常,但專家指出,屌絲這種相對貧乏感,是中國財富差距帶來的嚴重後果;他們覺得自己比過去更沒有機會向上流動。然而,他們確實是個行銷機會。雖然不易定義目標市場,但他們的人數確實比百萬富翁多出許多。

有的行銷人員並不認為上海和北京的IT員工是真正的屌絲,但研究顯示,他們真的相信自己是。去年,研究公司詢問了許多產業的上班族,問他們是否認為自己是屌絲;超過9成的程式設計師,以及約8成的食品業、服務業和行銷人員認為自己是屌絲。調查中最不認為自己是輸家的,則是替政府或共產黨工作的公務員。(黃維德編譯)

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014


Disillusioned office workers
China’s losers

Amid spreading prosperity, a generation of self-styled also-rans emerges
Apr 19th 2014 | SHANGHAI | From the print edition

天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 - 20140510 - 2

ZHU GUANG, a 25-year-old product tester, projects casual cool in his red Adidas jacket and canvas shoes. He sports the shadowy wisps of a moustache and goatee, as if he has the ambition to grow a beard but not the ability. On paper he is one of the millions of up-and-coming winners of the Chinese economy: a university graduate, the only child of factory workers in Shanghai, working for Lenovo, one of China’s leading computer-makers.

But Mr Zhu considers himself a loser, not a winner. He earns 4,000 yuan ($650) a month after tax and says he feels like a faceless drone at work. He eats at the office canteen and goes home at night to a rented, 20-square-metre (215-square-foot) room in a shared flat, where he plays online games. He does not have a girlfriend or any prospect of finding one. “Lack of confidence”, he explains when asked why not. Like millions of others, he mockingly calls himself, in evocative modern street slang, a diaosi, the term for a loser that literally translates as “male pubic hair”. Figuratively it is a declaration of powerlessness in an economy where it is getting harder for the regular guy to succeed. Calling himself by this derisive nickname is a way of crying out, “like Gandhi”, says Mr Zhu, only partly in jest. “It is a quiet form of protest.”

Calling yourself a diaosi has also become a proud statement of solidarity with the masses against the perceived corruption of the wealthy. The word itself entered the language only recently, appealing to office grunts across the country, especially in the IT industry. A mostly male species, diaosi are often daydreamers with poor social skills and an obsession with online gaming. They are slightly different from Japan’s marriage-shunning “herbivore” young men in that fewer of them have chosen their station in life. Society has chosen it for them, especially with property prices climbing well beyond their reach. Several recent studies show that, while incomes across Chinese society continue to rise, social mobility has worsened. Yi Chen of Nanjing Audit University and Frank A. Cowell of the London School of Economics found that, since 2000, people at the bottom of society were more likely than in the 1990s to stay where they were. “China has become more rigid,” they conclude.

An online video sketch show, “Diaosi Man”, shown on Sohu.com, an internet portal, mercilessly mocks the tribe. Since its debut in 2012, the show’s episodes have been streamed more than 1.5 billion times. In one recent episode a man tries to impress his beautiful dinner date with how busy he is at his job. He then receives a phone call from work, apologetically takes his leave to go to the office and finally pops up again as a waiter when his date asks for the bill. In the same episode a frustrated new driver curses repeatedly at a Lamborghini in the next lane and screams, “Are you bullying me because I don’t know any traffic cops?” In the next scene he is in a neck brace and his nose is broken.

Mr Zhu says what makes him a diaosi is that he is the son of factory workers. He is not fu er dai—second-generation rich—or guan er dai—the son of powerful government officials (it does not escape a diaosi’s notice that those two categories often overlap). He and his diaosi colleagues feel that, with connections or cash, they might have attended a better university and found a better job.

With after-tax income of nearly $8,000 a year, Mr Zhu would look to many people in China comfortably on his way to the middle class. He is among the lower wage-earners at Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park in Shanghai, but even many higher earners call themselves diaosi, or refer to themselves as “IT labourers”. Though their salaries are above average even in Shanghai—which had China’s third-highest annual urban disposable income per person in 2012 at 40,000 yuan—the cost of appearing successful is stratospheric. A fancy flat and a cool car are well beyond their reach. They are wage slaves who cannot hope to be gao fu shuai—tall, rich and handsome—and marry a woman who is bai fu mei—fair-skinned, rich and beautiful.

This might seem quite normal for a rapidly developing economy. But Zhang Yi, a sociologist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government think-tank in Beijing, says this diaosi feeling of relative deprivation is a troubling consequence of China’s growing wealth gap. In an interview devoted to the subject for the website of Phoenix Television, a Hong Kong satellite network, Mr Zhang concluded that people at the bottom feel utterly alienated. They feel less hopeful than they did before of ever moving up in life, he said.

In spite of this, however, they do still represent a marketing opportunity. There are, after all, many more of them than there are millionaires, even though it can be difficult to define the target market. At Dianping, a website offering restaurant reviews and consumer deals, Schubert You targets very low-wage workers in smaller cities (earning about $150 to $450 a month) with coupons and group discounts. Mr You does not consider the IT workers of Shanghai and Beijing to be true diaosi.

But surveys show they believe they are. Last year Analysys International, a research company in Beijing, asked a broad cross-section of office workers if they saw themselves as diaosi. More than 90% of programmers and journalists and about 80% of food and service industry and marketing workers said they did. Those surveyed who least identified with being losers were civil servants, working for the government or the Communist Party.

From the print edition: China



2014年2月3日 星期一

2014/2/3 「最低薪資制該留?或不該留?」

最低薪資制該留?或不該留?

摘錄自:天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報                        2013/1/31
2014-01-24 Web only 作者:經濟學人
 
天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 - 20140203
圖片來源:劉國泰
過去10年,不管景氣是好是壞,富有世界的勞工大多承受著薪資停滯的苦痛,越來越多政府也開始以提高最低薪資回應。歐巴馬支持將聯邦最低薪資由每小時7.25美元增至10.10美元,梅克爾的新政府有意支持訂立全國最低薪資,英國財政大臣奧斯本(George Osborne)亦支持高於通膨的最低薪資升幅。想改善勞工的生活,提高最低薪資似乎是個簡單又合理的作法,但許多經濟學家卻反對此事。為什麼經濟學家常會反對最低薪資?

歷史來看,經濟學家的質疑植基於擔心薪資下限會減少就業;他們擔心,由於最低薪資迫使企業支付更多薪資給員工,讓那些工作不符經濟效益,進而引發裁員。不過,1990年代初期,經濟學家亦被迫重新思考;當時,美國全國經濟研究所的卡德(David Card)和克魯格(Alan Krueger)提出證據證明,過去的最低薪資調升並未對就業產生預期效果。部分經濟學家推測,由於換工作的成本讓員工無法尋找薪水更高的工作,企業所支付的薪水原本就低於其支薪能力,因此,薪資被迫提高之時,企業不必裁員就能吸收成本。

芝加哥大學近期針對經濟學家進行調查,結果顯示,些微過半數的受訪者相信,將美國最低薪資增至每小時9美元以上,會讓貧窮勞工在找工作時「明顯地更為困難」。不過,亦有些微過半數的受訪者相信,由於那些找得到工作的人可以受益,確實值得調升最低薪資。有時,經濟學家反對特定最低薪資調升,是因為他們擔心政治人物會將下限設得太高。部分經濟學家則認為,薪資補助才是更好的手段,那得由政府出錢,但不會影響就業。

當前的總體經濟情勢,也讓最低薪資爭議更加複雜。在需求脆弱之時,企業可能會對薪資下限更加敏感(其他人則認為,企業獲利情況良好,表示企業有能力支付更高的薪資)。新科技也有機會放大薪資提高對就業的影響;自動化的機會越來越多,企業可能會以最低薪資提升為藉口,重組生產並裁員。不過,經濟學家的看法依舊分岐,因為近期最低薪資的升幅大多相對和緩。(黃維德譯)

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014



The Economist

Why some economists oppose minimum wages
The Economist explains

By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: January 24, 2014

WORKERS across the rich world have suffered stagnant wages for much of the past decade, in good times and bad. Governments are increasingly responding by boosting minimum wage-rates. State and local governments in America are passing wage increases, and Barack Obama supports a rise in the federal rate from $7.25 per hour to $10.10. Angela Merkel's new government has signalled its support for a new national minimum wage, and on January 16th George Osborne, Britain's chancellor, backed an above-inflation rise in the minimum wage. A higher wage floor seems like a simple and sensible way to improve workers' fortunes. Yet many economists argue against it: Germany's leading economic institutes, for instance, have pushed Ms Merkel to resist calls for a wage floor. Why do economists often oppose minimum wage-rates?

Historically, economists' scepticism was rooted in the worry that wage floors reduce employment. Firms will hire all the workers it makes sense to hire at prevailing wages, the thinking goes, so any minimum wage that forces firms to pay existing workers more will make those jobs uneconomical, leading to sackings. Yet economists were forced to rethink their views in the early 1990s, when David Card and Alan Krueger of America's National Bureau of Economic Research presented evidencethat past minimum-wage increases did not have the expected effect on employment. A rise in New Jersey's minimum wage did not seem to slow hiring in fast-food restaurants in New Jersey relative to those in neighbouring Pennsylvania, they found. One explanation, some economists speculated, was that firms had previously been getting away with paying workers less than they were able, because workers were prevented from searching for better-paid work by the costs involved in changing jobs. That would mean that when wages were forced up, the firms were able to absorb the costs without firing anyone.

Academics continue to trade studies on whether minimum wages cost jobs. A recent surveyof economists by the University of Chicago showed that a narrow majority of respondents believe a rise in America's minimum wage to $9 per hour would make it "noticeably harder" for poor workers to find jobs. Yet a narrow majority also thought a rise would nonetheless be worthwhile, given the benefits to those who could find work. Economists' opposition to specific minimum-wage hikes is sometimes due to concerns that politicians will impose recklessly high wage-floors, which firms may find difficult to absorb without laying people off. Some economists argue that there is a better alternative in the form of wage subsidies, which cost governments money but do not discourage hiring.

Recent minimum-wage debates have been complicated by the unusual macroeconomic circumstances of the day. When economies are plagued by weak demand, as much of the rich world has been since the crisis of 2008, firms may be more sensitive to wage floors. (Others argue that healthy corporate profits show that firms have plenty of room to accommodate pay rises.) New technologies could also amplify the employment effect of a wage hike. Given expanding opportunities for automation, firms may seize on higher wage-floors as an excuse to reorganise production and shed jobs. But opinion among economists remains divided (and studies contradictory), because most recent minimum-wage increases have been comparatively modest.

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014



2013年9月29日 星期日

2013/9/29 「台灣薪資大崩盤」

台灣薪資大崩盤

廉價派遣工十年增加七倍 政府帶頭壓榨

摘錄自:今周刊電子報                            2013/9/25
今周刊‧撰文:楊卓翰、林麗娟、楊政諭

不只企業愛用派遣工,連政府也大量進用,10年來台灣薪資倒退近6%!獨家取得勞委會最新草案,揭露政府將取消派遣上限,衝擊全台一千萬勞工。

主計總處最新統計,今年的實質平均薪資三萬六千元,一口氣倒退回十六年前的水準,還比十年前少六%,更讓人擔憂的是,除了「22K」之外,「派遣」已經成為拉低台灣薪資的主要原因之一,國科會調查派遣平均薪資,只有二萬六千八百元,是另一個箍住年輕人薪水的魔咒。

勞工界的孤兒!五十七萬派遣工 比外勞還弱勢!

法律上,要派公司不用支付派遣工保險、獎金、休假等福利,甚至資遣派遣工時,要派公司連資遣費都不用出。派遣工也沒有任何升遷管道,他們連名片也沒有,因為公司根本不承認有這些員工,像用完的寶特瓶,喝光後就丟回給派遣公司資源回收。

二○○八年金融海嘯後,台灣的派遣人力大幅增加。學者及勞委會也統計,臨時性或派遣勞工人數從○二年的七萬多名,暴增了七倍,到去年的五十七萬名,早就超越外勞的四十萬名,但他們的工作,甚至比外勞更沒保障。

政府是最大派遣戶!愛用廉價高材生 比率最高逾六成!

不只是民間企業愛用派遣,更誇張的是,政府竟然才是全國最大派遣戶,而且還用低於合理薪資三到四成的超低價,讓台灣的薪資更進一步崩壞。根據監察院前年調查政府派遣勞工問題時發現,農委會及所屬機關派遣勞工達2803人、經濟部有2433人、教育部有1174人,高居各部會前三名。整個中央機關,派遣勞工竟超過萬人。

扯!用最低標壓榨 把派遣人力當商品

政府單位的人力需求,大量採用「價格標」,於是派遣公司為了得標,自然就壓低「商品」的價格,派遣工這些「商品」,也就愈來愈不值錢。

政府用低於市價四成的低標大量採購派遣工,在政府單位當過五年派遣工的謝先生感受最深。他在法務部待過五年,換過三家派遣公司,政府一開始從一人月薪三一五○○元開始招標司機,後來降成三萬元。派遣業者的利潤被壓縮,因此向派遣工抽取的「介紹費」也逐年增長,變相壓榨勞工。

「原本一個月派遣公司要抽七千五百元,但每換一家,條件就變差,」派遣公司找到各種名目向派遣工抽錢,「最後連勞保、健保都幾乎可以從我們身上扣回來,一個月活生生抽掉一萬元。」薪水愈做愈少的謝先生,最後因難以忍受而辭去派遣工作。

勞委會新草案擬取消上限!大開門戶 衝擊全台一千萬勞工!

《今周刊》獨家取得九月六日最新修正版的《派遣勞工保護法》草案,赫見第二十三條分為甲案和乙案,當乙案規定派遣工不得超過企業員額四○%時,甲案卻是「不規範要派單位使用派遣人數比例限制」。「勞委會打算取消上限,覺得如果訂定上限,反而會『鼓勵企業用盡派遣員額』,增加派遣人數。」林佳和說。但是,這種解釋實在難以說服勞團,孫友聯就大力指責勞委會打算取消上限,再加上只針對保全、醫療等少數產業禁止派遣,根本是為了方便政府自己大量使用派遣訂出的法律,等於是大開門戶,「讓企業和政府派遣於法有據,正職工將全面被取代!」他擔憂地說。

一向「自我感覺良好」的總統馬英九,日前雖也為年輕人的低薪問題「感到歉疚」,卻沒有發現當他追求台灣經濟成長時,極速成長的派遣工市場,惡化的勞動條件,已讓多少台灣年輕人失去夢想?面對派遣魔咒,惡化年輕人的低薪問題,馬總統不應該只有歉疚,而是正視面對,整個社會更不該再冷眼旁觀。

派遣法規最後定案究竟如何走,又會如何衝擊擁有一千萬勞工的勞動市場?


編按:本文摘自9月25日出刊之《今周刊》875期封面故事「台灣薪資大崩盤」,同期內容除本文外,並有「日本派遣氾濫 經濟長期停滯幫凶」、「五大解方 終結人力派遣亂象」等系列報導,更多內容請參閱875期《今周刊》。(資料來源:今周刊875期!)