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2014年12月25日 星期四

2014/12/25 「盧布大跌 俄羅斯經濟陷危機」

盧布大跌 俄羅斯經濟陷危機

摘錄自:天下雜誌每日報電子報                        2014/12/23
2014-12-22 Web only  作者:經濟學人

天下雜誌每日報電子報 - 20141225
圖片來源:flickr.com/photos/bobmendo/14376146956
 這次盧布危機終結了普丁式消費時代,亦即政府承諾讓中產階級的生活水準提升,以換取他們的沉默。普丁接下來會怎麼做?
 
俄羅斯盧布大貶之際,俄羅斯曾在90年代嚴重通膨、1998年貨幣貶值時發展的求生直覺,也因為逐漸浮現的貨幣危機而再次覺醒。俄羅斯人忙著在盧布還有價值的時候花費盧布,換匯機構也訂購三位數的電子告示牌,以備盧布兌歐元匯率突破100盧布。

過去15年,石油價格上漲支撐著克林姆林假想的經濟穩定,現在,俄羅斯卻被1998年貨幣大貶和破產的噩夢纏身。俄羅斯不再是那個樂見普丁併吞克里米亞的國家了;總理麥維德夫(Dmitry Medvedev)在12月15日於報紙發表文章,談論烏克蘭的經濟問題,但俄羅斯讀者忙著關注本國危機,根本無心於此事。

普丁的支持率仍舊高達85%,此次危機是否會影響他的支持率,目前還不能下定論,但支持率下滑的速度,可能會快過多數西方分析師的想像。越來越多人認定,俄羅斯經濟問題和國際孤立的元兇就是政府,烏克蘭戰爭也無法繼續吸引觀眾。

本次危機終結了普丁式消費時代,亦即政府承諾讓中產階級的生活水準提升,以換取他們的沉默。普丁接下來會怎麼做?他必定會將俄羅斯的問題怪罪於內部和外部敵人,但想真正有效果,此策略必須靠政治壓迫來支持──但俄羅斯民眾不打算接受此事。他可以試圖重啟烏克蘭戰爭,但多數民眾不支持俄羅斯軍隊前往烏克蘭。事實上,過去幾天,莫斯科對基輔的措辭已有所軟化。

俄羅斯外長拉夫洛夫(Sergei Lavrov)於12月16日表示,俄羅斯並不堅持烏克蘭聯邦化或頓巴斯自治,與克里姆林先前的立場極為不同。數月來,俄羅斯對烏克蘭行動與經濟問題的關聯性嗤之以鼻,認定盧布下跌與油價下跌有關;但在過去幾天,這樣的關聯性已然破裂,顯示盧布下跌亦反映了各界對俄羅斯治理能力缺乏信心。

在此同時,形象戰爭亦全面展開。普丁記者會的宣傳影片中,可以見到基輔的火焰與煙霧、索契冬奧金牌、美元崩潰(顯然是假設)和克里米亞的捲捲浪花;其中,看不見盧布的身影。(黃維德編譯)

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014



2014年8月16日 星期六

2014/8/16 「普丁治國 搞丟一兆美元」

普丁治國 搞丟一兆美元

摘錄自:天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報                        2014/8/15
2014-08-06 天下雜誌 553期   作者:經濟學人

天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 - 20140816
圖片來源:達志影像/路透社提供
 股價評等低,讓俄羅斯投資人損失了一兆美元,這背後全是西方國家貿易制裁的錯?其實早在克里米亞事件前,俄羅斯的公司治理就令人不敢恭維,政府難辭其咎。
 
普丁治國,讓俄羅斯投資人損失了一兆美元,相當每個俄羅斯公民平均損失七千美元(約二十一萬台幣)。

這個數字,來自投資人對俄羅斯資產的不信任,導致俄羅斯股價評等極低,平均本益比僅五.二,總市值僅○.七三五兆美元。若以新興市場平均本益比十二.五計算,俄羅斯股市總市值應高達一.七七兆美元。

俄羅斯政府難辭其咎。與普丁交惡的石油大亨霍多爾科夫斯基被捕入獄、舉報政府貪腐的基金操盤手布勞德爾遭驅逐出境,種種事件都讓投資人對俄羅斯的公司治理戒慎恐懼。加上俄羅斯併吞克里米亞、支持烏克蘭叛軍,更引發疑慮。

股市折價使得外國投資減少、資金外流,是造成俄羅斯去年經濟衰退○.四%的原因之一,傷害全民利益。

當然也有分析師不時指出,俄羅斯本益比低,全球投資人應逢低大量買進。但往往話聲剛落,普丁政權的善變性格立即浮現,擊碎投資人的期待。

近來,投資者對地緣政治風險的戒心愈來愈低,因為戰事都停留在地域性衝突,也沒有造成像石油危機一樣劇烈的經濟動盪。總體而言,即使戰事造成全球股市短期震盪,也很快就會止跌回升。

然而,某些國家的政治風險仍高。除了俄羅斯,包括伊朗和阿根廷等國,在新興國裡也因「惹人嫌」,常被西方國家貿易制裁,容易造成股市折價,投資界慣稱「惹人嫌政府的折價因子」(DOG factor)。

投資人懲罰「惹人嫌」政府的方式,不僅反映在股價上,也反映在債市上。曾經操作通膨率、違約倒債的阿根廷,國債殖利率高達九.八%,比墨西哥債券高五個百分點。

不少上述國家的國民將各種折價現象,歸咎於西方人的偏見或國際資本主義。但實際上,他們如何處置手邊資產─留在國內、或投資海外─才是終極大考驗。自家國民對政府的信任,由此可見一斑。(李立心譯)

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014




2014年7月21日 星期一

2014/7/21 「中、俄牽手 最危險的好朋友」

中、俄牽手 最危險的好朋友

摘錄自:天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報                        2014/7/18
2014-05-28 天下雜誌 548期   作者:經濟學人

天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 - 20140721
圖片來源:達志影像/路透社提供
 雖然有共同的敵人美國、雖然剛簽下高達四千億美元的天然氣合約,但中、俄人前友好的背後,矛盾也是如潮暗湧。
 
五月二十一日,習近平和普丁簽下了一紙天然氣合約:從二○一八年起,俄羅斯將向中國出口天然氣,為期三十年,總價四千億美元,創下俄羅斯單一協議最高金額紀錄。

這份得來不易的合約,交涉期長達十年。這不僅讓俄羅斯能減少對天然氣出口歐洲的依賴,還能在美國威脅實施經濟制裁時,讓大家看到它並不缺盟友。

中國與俄羅斯都希望展現自己是區域強權,也都與美國關係緊張,聲稱美國處處阻撓它們發展。

從商業合作到地緣政治,中俄關係愈走愈近,普丁「向東看」,是否意味中俄重新結盟對付美國?未必,因為它倆是「敵友」(frenemies,friends+enemies)。

普丁顯然很希望塑造這樣的印象。他在出訪中國前,對媒體放話說,中國是俄羅斯「可靠的好朋友」,兩國關係是「本世紀以來最緊密」。俄羅斯也是習近平一三年上台後,第一個出訪的國家。

中俄貿易額在去年達到九百億美元,七年內可望倍增。發展中的中國亟需俄羅斯的豐富天然資源,這份天然氣合約,可讓中國減少燃煤,緩解城市嚴重的空污問題。

中俄都自豪於悠久歷史,更不甘願看美國的臉色行事。俄羅斯將克里米亞據為己有,令美國與歐洲不滿,讓普丁陷入孤立。中國則是在東海與南海擴張勢力,引起許多鄰國憂心。

但西方國家不用太緊張。中國與俄羅斯之間還是有矛盾存在。

中國還是略佔上風

以天然氣合約來說,談判了十年,還趕在普丁出訪中國前夕拍板定案,可見過程有多不順。據說,中國因為知道普丁急著在出訪時展現成果,還趁機大砍價。

未完……



2014年3月16日 星期日

2014/3/16 「普丁真正的毀滅性武器是金融」

普丁真正的毀滅性武器是金融

一天損失1.7兆元的軍事演習 只是烏克蘭危機序曲

摘錄自:今周刊電子報                            2014/3/12
今周刊.撰文:鄭超文

今周刊電子報 - 20140316

烏克蘭三月十六日將舉行克里米亞獨立公投,俄羅斯總統普丁絕對不讓烏克蘭投向歐盟懷抱。他掌握的勝算籌碼,不是擁有核彈的軍事實力,而是足以讓歐洲金融崩潰的五千億美元外匯存底,以及俄羅斯權貴與歐洲金融界的緊密關係。







俄羅斯大獨裁者普丁,為了抓住人口只有兩百萬人的克里米亞半島,一不小心將自己放到全世界政治軍事傾軋的靶心。如今,這個從肉體到心靈都極為強悍、什麼都不怕的獨裁者,正面臨人生最大的一場考驗,只要一個閃神,不只自己將會粉身碎骨,還會拉著他的俄羅斯帝國一同陪葬。

但是,普丁不會怯戰,失去了烏克蘭的俄羅斯帝國,將淪為遙遠北方的二流勢力,正如同中國絕不放棄台灣,普丁也絕對不會讓烏克蘭叛逃到歐盟的懷抱中。

更何況,普丁王朝不僅牢牢掌握著俄羅斯政治經濟的資源,他們的貪腐資金灌滿了歐洲銀行的金庫、他們的妻子買飽了倫敦與巴黎最奢華的豪宅,俄羅斯與歐洲的金融利益早已如膠似漆。普丁手上的經濟金融籌碼,跟他軍火庫中的核子飛彈,同樣是足以摧毀全球安定的毀滅性武器,所以普丁當然不會怯戰。

對決股市金融 俄損失慘重

就在今年三月一日星期六,俄羅斯國會授權普丁對克里米亞出兵,普丁隨即展開讓外界搞不清楚是侵略、還是演習的軍事行動。雖然動用軍隊的規模很小,卻立刻引起以德國為首的歐盟,聯手美國總統歐巴馬的強烈反應,引發外交、軍事、經濟全面的國際對峙。

外界擔憂的軍事衝突並未發生,真正的對決發生在金融市場。三月三日星期一,俄羅斯股市暴跌一一%、隨後開市的德國股市跌了三.三%,倫敦與紐約則以下挫一.五%收盤,金融市場對決的結果勝負立見,美國與德國雖然重傷,俄羅斯卻大敗。兩天之後,普丁將部隊撤回俄羅斯境內的軍事基地,重回談判桌。

三月三日俄羅斯股市總市值一天蒸發五八四億美元(約新台幣一兆七千七百億元),相當於台灣一整年的中央政府總收入。三月一日出兵前的俄羅斯股市總市值,還有五七五○億美元,到了三月三日剩下五一二○億美元,損失比金融海嘯時期還慘烈。

更糟的是,普丁最大的財庫OAO Gazprom國營獨占石油氣公司,當天暴跌了一四%,而最大的銀行Sberbank則崩跌一五%。普丁進軍克里米亞的決策,堪稱史上最昂貴的、損失最慘重的軍演。

三月三日股市暴跌只是一個「小小的電擊」,曾貴為金磚四國、受到投資人追捧的俄羅斯早已疲態畢露,持續第三年承受資金外流的壓力。資金外流不僅來自於歐美外資,也來自於普丁培養出來的權貴大亨們。

俄羅斯盧布兌美元的匯價,與一年前相比重貶了一八%,其中有一一%來自於過去三個月內的資金外逃。如果軍事衝突升高,總金額超過千億美元的歐元債券、俄羅斯違約交換合約、OFZ聯邦政府債券(盧布計價的俄羅斯聯邦政府債券)都可能面臨賣出的壓力,造成俄羅斯全面的金融危機。

普丁在千禧年前從葉爾欽手中接下政權,二○○○年五月正式出任俄羅斯總統,前面七年藉著能源輸出,為俄羅斯蓄積了龐大的財富,在金融海嘯之前,俄羅斯外匯存底一度逼近六千億美元。但是,金融海嘯改變了全球的金融生態,俄羅斯的能源魔法就此消失,經濟成長日益疲弱、通貨膨脹從一二年的三%,突然向上跳升,去年年中已經翻倍到七.四%。

一二年是普丁王朝經濟實力盛極而衰的關鍵,當年經濟成長停滯、通貨膨脹劇揚、外匯存底開始下滑,海外負債卻反向暴增。

俄羅斯外匯存底到今年元月已經跌破五千億美元關卡,政府外債則一路向上狂飆,一二年底已經累積了六千一百億美元的外債,比當年的外匯存底高一六%;去年外債又新增一千三百億美元,累計七三二○億美元的外債,是外匯存底的一.五倍,外債比外匯存底多透支了兩千三百億美元。

(資料來源:今周刊899期!)


2013年12月31日 星期二

2013/12/31 「監禁10年 俄石油大亨獲釋」

監禁10年 俄石油大亨獲釋

摘錄自:天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報                        2013/12/27
2013-12-25 Web only 作者:經濟學人

天下雜誌 經濟學人電子報 - 20131231
圖片來源:flickr.com/photos/7141213@N04/
霍多科夫斯基穿著深藍色西裝、白襯杉和領帶,與一小群會說俄語的記者會面。36小時前,他還待在俄羅斯西北部的監獄之中;他曾是石油大亨,也是俄羅斯最知名的政治犯,總計在監獄中待了10年。

他說話的口氣堅決,卻也不帶憤怒、沒有崩潰;他進監獄之時,是個與俄羅斯總統普丁針鋒相對的企業大亨,出獄時則是俄羅斯當代歷史中最重要、最高貴的人物。

霍多科夫斯基獲釋,是由前德國外長根舍(Hans Dietrich Gensher)促成。根舍推動霍多科夫斯基特赦,亦獲得德國總理梅克爾的支持;此想法最初是在麥維德夫(Dmitry Medvedev)擔任總統之時提出,但克林姆林要求霍多科夫承認其罪行。

霍多科夫斯基無法接受此條件,並不是因為那是個謊言──他的案子大多是由謊言構成──而是因為那會讓曾在他的石油公司工作的人,身陷遭到起訴的風險之中。

但在11月某個時刻,俄羅斯同意了新的方案:霍多科夫斯基得寫信請求寬容,並提及他母親的健康情況不佳,但不必承認罪行。霍多科夫斯基也會請求普丁讓他離開俄羅斯,前往德國探視正在接受治療的母親;如此一來,情況就比較不像是俄羅斯將他驅逐──雖然實際上是如此──而是普丁的寬容之行。

部分普丁身邊的人士,越來越擔心俄羅斯經濟惡化以及國外形象不佳;另一部分則相信,唯有增強拑制才能繼續掌權。霍多科夫斯基寫信之後,普丁等了超過一個月才宣佈特赦,亦顯示兩方之間的確有爭執。

霍多科夫斯基無意涉入俄羅斯的權力鬥爭,但那並不表示他不會活躍於政治圈;在今日的俄羅斯,很少有人擁有他那樣的份量和道德高度。正如霍多科夫斯基所說,俄羅斯的問題並非總統個人,而是俄羅斯大部分民眾並不了解,他們得為自己的命運負責。他希望反對勢力也能學到和他相同的教訓:不要將你的同胞──不管是對手、掌權者還是反對者──逼到死角,無論如何,大家都得住在同一個國家。在他心中,那正是曼德拉的貢獻。(黃維德譯)

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2013



The Economist

Mikhail Khodorkovsky
In from the cold

By The Economist
From The Economist
Published: December 25, 2013

Dec 23rd 2013, 14:45 by A.O. | BERLIN
 
A DARK navy suit, a white shirt and a tie sit awkwardly on Mikhail Khodorkovsky as though his slightly slouched body is still fighting these garments. Meeting a small group of Russian-speaking journalists, including your correspondent, at Checkpoint Charlie Museum in Berlin, he is still adjusting to normal sensations, as someone who walks in from the cold and dark into a brightly lit and overheated room. Thirty-six hours earlier Mr Khodorkovsky, a former tycoon who became Russia's most famous political prisoner, was still inside Penal Colony Number Seven, in Korelia, the north west of Russia, where he was serving his second jail term. The first one was in Siberia. His imprisonment lasted ten years altogether.

"I am glad to see you all. Since most of you I met ten years ago, for me this [meeting] is a bridge to freedom," he says quietly with a smile. Mentally, he still seems on the other shore, in a different world closed to most people in the room, where his personal space was shrunk to a minimum, where his every move was followed by video cameras and where time stopped—or expanded—infinitely. He speaks quietly and meaningfully, weighing every word and testing it for it true value and accuracy and sincerity. "I certainly earned the right not to say what I don't think". He sounds tough, but not angered and not broken.

"I was trying to look at my situation as a challenge. OK, enemy forces got me. So, the situation is grave. But it also offers some opportunities." He used this opportunity to the full—reading, writing, reviewing the values of his life and the fate of his country. He went in as a business tycoon who had crossed President Vladimir Putin. He came out as one of the most significant and dignified figures in modern Russian history.

Choosing Checkpoint Charlie—which symbolised the East-West divide—as the venue for his first public appearance heightened the sense of history, even though this was hardly necessary. Many Russian dissidents came here, including Elena Bonner, the wife of Andrei Sakharov. The portraits of Sakharov and Nelson Mandela decorate the walls of the room. Above Mr Khodorkovsky's head in big letters is printed one of the articles of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights". In 2003, when Mr Khodorkovsky was arrested, such company would have seemed absurd. Ten years on, it looks natural, largely thanks to his own courage and dignity.

Museums usually deal with history. But in the Checkpoint Charlie Museum history was unfolding in the present: Mr Khodorkovsky spoke to journalists next to a room which was dedicated to his time in jail. Mr Khodorkovsky's main press conference, was broadcast on a screen at the entrance to the museum, turning into an instant artefact. Ordinary visitors watched it in real time before examining other things on display, including a hand-written copy of his "last word" given at the end of his shameful show-trial in 2010 in a Moscow court room, now displayed in a special glass case.

A timeline on the wall of the museum ends with October 25th, 2013—the tenth anniversary of Mr Khodorkovsky's imprisonment. "He has been unlawfully locked up in Russia's prisons and camps" serving "the longest sentence ever imposed on political prisoners in Russia", the timeline reads. On December 20th, "has been" turned into "was". The way in which it happened was in keeping with "the best traditions of the 1970s", Mr Khodorkovsky drily notes. He says he was woken at 2am on December 19th, several hours after Mr Putin stunned journalists in Russia and the world with his casual remark to the cameras that he was planning to pardon Mr Khodorkovsky. He was taken to the nearest town and put on a plane to St Petersburg, where he was transferred onto a private German aircraft that waited for him on the tarmac, and flown to Berlin. "The convoy left only when the aircraft door closed behind me," he says.

This cold-war style operation was the result of two-and-a-half years' work by Hans Dietrich Gensher, the 86-year-old former German foreign minister who oversaw the reunification of Germany. His mission to broker Mr Khodorkovsky's pardon was supported by Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, who had regularly raised the subject of Mr Khodorkovsky's imprisonment with Mr Putin. Mr Gensher held two meetings with Mr Putin over the time. He also was in contact with Mr Khodorkovsky, mostly through his lawyers. The idea was first raised under Dmitry Medvedev, who stood in for Mr Putin as Russia's president from 2008-12. But the Kremlin demanded that Mr Khodorkovsky admit his guilt.

This, Mr Khodorkovsky says, was unacceptable not because it was a lie—most things in his case were—but because it would have put people who worked for Yukos, his oil company, at risk of prosecution as part of a conspiracy. Those who had fled abroad could have been extradited. "I could not take it upon myself," he says.

But sometime in November a new formula was agreed: Mr Khodorkovsky would write a letter asking for clemency and mentioning his mother's deteriorating health, but there would be no admission of guilt. Mr Khodorkovsky would also ask Mr Putin to allow him to leave the country and travel to Germany, where his mother was undergoing treatment at the time. That way, it would be less like an expulsion from the country—which it effectively was—but an act of mercy on Mr Putin's part. On November 12th Mr Khodorkovsky wrote a letter to Mr Putin, asking for pardon without any mention of his guilt. He also wrote another letter to Mr Putin, telling him that he has no intention of getting into everyday politics and would not fight for the return of Yukos's assets, which have been expropriated by the Kremlin.

It appears that Mr Kodorkovsky's being prepared to leave Russia was one of the main reasons for swaying Mr Putin's decision to let him out of jail. Mr Khodorkovsky says he cannot return to Russia because there is a risk he would not be let out again (there is still a $550m claim against him stemming from the first case).

In the end, Mr Khodorkovsky's release had more in common with the expulsion of dissidents—such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn or Vladimir Bukovsky—than it did with the return of Andrei Sakharov from exile in 1986, which signalled the seriousness of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika. And as Mr Khodorkovsky says, whereas his arrest in 2003 symbolised Russia's turn towards an authoritarian, corporatist state run by former KGB men, his release is not a symbol of the reversal of that trend. Rather, he says, "It is also a sign that Putin and some people in the Kremlin have become seriously concerned about Russia's image. Whether this concern leads to a real change is a subject of intense fighting within the Kremlin."

While one part of Mr Putin's entourage is increasingly worried about Russia's worsening economic situation and its image abroad, another part believes that tightening the screws further and bringing in more repression is the only way to stay in power. The fact that it took more than a month after Mr Khodorkovsky's letter for Mr Putin to announce his decision is one sign of the fighting between them.

In early December Russia's deputy prosecutor started to talk on the record about a likely third case against Mr Khodorkovsky, which had "very good potential". As one person close to Mr Khodorkovsky says, this was intended for Mr Putin's ears. But at his press conference on December 19th—the day celebrating the security services—Mr Putin put an end to it, saying a third case had no chances. He then announced his decision to pardon Mr Khodorkovsky. (Mr Putin has since also granted an amnesty to members of the Pussy Riot band). Is Mr Khodorkovsky grateful to the man who kept him in jail for ten years and released him a few months before his term was due to expire, to improve his own image?

"I was really contemplating for a long time how I would express what I feel toward Mr Putin. All these years, all the decisions in my case, were made by one person. And it would be hard to say that I am grateful to him. Let me say: I am happy about this decision. That would be the most precise," he says. But while Mr Khodorkovsky does not intend to get involved in a struggle for political power, it does not mean that he will not be politically active. His weight and moral authority—earned by the ten-year incarceration—are rare in today's Russia.

And as Mr Khodorkovsky says, "The Russian problem is not just the president as a person, the problem is that our citizens in the large majority don't understand that they have to be responsible for their own fate. They are so happy to delegate it to, say, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and then they will entrust it to somebody else, and I think that for such a big country as Russia this is the path to a dead end." His thoughts may be as unpalatable to Russia's opposition as they are to the Kremlin.

"The main lesson that I have drawn and I would wish that our opposition would draw the same lesson: Don't push your fellow citizens—be they opponents, or in power, or in the opposition—into a corner. No matter what, we have to live in the same country. This is what Mandela contributed, in my opinion. That's what I say, that's what I write, and that is what many criticise me for. And, thank God, so be it."

©The Economist Newspaper Limited 2013